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1 Introduction
The present paper analyses the welfare implications of tariﬀ reform by a non-preferential
trading club. We define a non-preferential trading club as a group of countries that agree
to coordinate their non-discriminatory tariﬀ policies and to undertake internal income
transfers. By contrast, a preferential trading club (such as customs unions and free trade
areas) provides preferential tariﬀ rates to club members and hence is discriminatory in its
tariﬀ policies (see Panagariya, 2000).
While academic research has focused on preferential trading arrangements on the
one hand and on multilateral tariﬀ reforms on the other, interest in the study of non-
preferential trading arrangements by a subset of countries is sparked by the policy debate
concerning “open regionalism” (see Bergsten, 1997). The present paper is the first to
provide a theoretical justification for the advantages of open regionalism.
By combining tools from multilateral tariﬀ reform theory1 and features of the Kemp-
Wan-Ohyama (henceforth KWO) mechanism for the creation of welfare improving customs
unions,2 we show that there exist regional, MFN-consistent arrangements that lead to
Pareto improvements in world welfare.3 Within a many country, many commodity general
equilibrium model of trade we establish the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for a strict
Pareto improvement in club welfare. Careful interpretation of this result leads to a number
of propositions that spell out the implications of our non-preferential trading clubs. These
propositions show that a trading club can obtain a strict Pareto improvement in club
1See, for example, Fukushima and Kim (1989), Diewert, Turunen-Red and Woodland (1989), Turunen-
Red and Woodland (1991), and Anderson and Neary (1992).
2The main idea was first mentioned by Kemp (1964) and Vanek (1965) and later rigorously employed
by Ohyama (1972) and Kemp and Wan (1976).
3Neary (1998) also combines the tariﬀ reform literature and the Kemp-Wan-Ohyama mechansim. How-
ever, his emphasis is upon the replication of the Kemp-Wan-Ohyama proposition and not, as in this paper,
on non-preferential trading clubs.
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welfare, while maintaining the welfare levels of all other countries at their pre-club levels.
Moreover, a sequence of such welfare improvements exists as long as the prices in the
member countries are not all equal. The limit of such a sequence of trading-club equilibria
is an equilibrium that is conditionally Pareto optimal for the club members. Finally, this
equilibrium is shown to be welfare equivalent (but not completely identical) to the KWO
customs union equilibrium.
Aspects of the KWO mechanism have appeared in some studies outside the cus-
toms union context. First, Bagwell and Staiger (1999, 2004) have elegantly employed
the “keeping-world-prices-fixed” idea in explaining the economics of GATT negotiations.
They showed that negotiated tariﬀ changes made under the principles of reciprocity and
non-discrimination - the two pillars of the GATT - lead necessarily to fixed world prices,
thus eliminating the incentive for aggressive use of tariﬀs to generate favourable terms-of-
trade eﬀects. Second, Ohyama (2002) and Panagariya and Krishna (2002) use the KWO
mechanism in designing free trade areas that lead to Pareto improvements in world wel-
fare, thus extending the KWO result for customs unions to free trade areas. In the present
paper, the application is in a yet diﬀerent area — that of trading clubs.
2 Pareto Welfare Gains in Trading Clubs
We consider a perfectly competitive general equilibrium model of the world, consisting of
K nations trading in L internationally tradeable commodities. Following Turunen-Red
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and Woodland (1991), the model may be expressed as
X
k∈K
Skp (p
k, uk) = 0 (1)
p|Skp (p
k, uk) = bk, k ∈ K (2)X
k∈K
bk = 0, (3)
in terms of the world price vector p (p| denotes the transpose of a vector), domestic price
vectors pk = p+ tk, representative agents’ utility levels uk and transfers abroad bk for each
country k ∈ K. The net revenue function Sk(pk, uk) ≡ Gk(pk)−Ek(pk, uk) is the diﬀerence
between the gross domestic product function Gk and the consumer expenditure function
Ek. The gradient of the net revenue function with respect to prices, xk ≡ Skp (pk, uk) ≡
∇pSk(pk, uk), is the vector of compensated net export functions for nation k.
Equations (1)-(3) consist of the market equilibrium conditions, the budget constraints
for each country and the world budget constraint. The market equilibrium conditions
express the requirement that the net exports of countries sum to the zero vector, meaning
that world markets clear. The budget constraints state that each country’s balance of
trade must be matched by a transfer of income abroad, bk. The world budget constraint
require these transfers abroad to sum to zero over all countries.
Countries are divided into two groups — those that wish to form a trading club and
those that do not. The set of countries that form the trading club is denoted by KM , while
KN is the set of non-club countries. Let u = (uM , uN ), t = (tM , tN ), and b = (bM , bN) be
obvious partitions of the vectors u, t and b into elements for club members (M) and non-
member countries (N). The initial equilibrium, before the club is formed, is arbitrarily
given and characterized by (p, u) = (p0, u0) and (t, b) = (t0, 0). At this initial equilibrium,
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the vector of aggregate trade between (to be) club members and non-members is given
by the net export vector xM0 ≡
P
k∈KM S
k
p (p
k
0, u
k
0). The initial equilibrium might, of
course, be a Nash equilibrium in a non-cooperative tariﬀ game but this interpretation is
not essential.4
Attention is restricted to coordinated non-discriminatory tariﬀ reforms and intra-club
transfers of income. Attention is further restricted to reforms that ensure that the vector
of trade between the trading club and the rest of the world remains unaltered. Assuming
passive policy behavior on the part of the rest of the world, whereby the countries in the
rest of the world do not alter their tariﬀ policies as a result of the club’s activities, these
reforms ensure that the world prices of traded goods are also unaltered.5
Specifically, the club is to choose domestic price vectors pk, a vector of transfers bM and
a vector of utilities uM that generate the same external trade vector as before, satisfy the
aggregate balance of trade restriction at the same world prices as before and provide greater
utility for all union members. Since the club’s balance of trade restriction automatically
holds (p|0x
M
0 = 0) due to the price homogeneity properties of the foreign net export
functions and since transfers are available, only the internal market equilibrium conditions
are constraining for the club.
Given the requirement that the aggregate trade vector with the rest of the world is
set at its the pre-club value, xM0 , the internal club market equilibrium condition may be
4Morevover, it is not necessary to assume that the initial equilibrium involves no income transfers. This
assumption is made merely to simplify the exposition.
5As Richardson (1995) demonstrates via an example, the Kemp-Wan-Ohyama proposition may break
down if the rest of the world alters its tariﬀs strategically. To counter this observation Kemp and Shi-
momura (2001) have provided a second “elementary proposition on customs unions” whereby the union
chooses, not a common external tariﬀ vector, but a common external tariﬀ function that leaves the union’s
oﬀer surface unchanged and thus ensures a strict Pareto improvement for the union irrespective of the
response by the rest of the world. Both Richardson’s critique and the Kemp and Shimomura response
apply also to our analysis of trading clubs.
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expressed as X
k∈KM
Skp (p
k, uk) = xM0 . (4)
To proceed further, we diﬀerentiate the club market equilibrium conditions (4) totally to
get X
k∈KM
Skpp(p
k, uk)dpk +
X
k∈KM
Skpu(p
k, uk)duk = 0, (5)
where Skpp ≡ ∇2pSk(p, uk) = ∇pSkp (p, uk) is the substitution matrix for country k, measur-
ing the response of compensated net outputs to changes in prices, and Skpu ≡ ∇puSk(p, uk) =
∇uSkp (p, uk) is a vector of ‘income’ eﬀects for country k, measuring the response of com-
pensated net outputs to changes in utility. We consider whether a solution to this system
exists with duk > 0, k ∈ KM . To obtain our main result, the following assumption on
technologies and preferences is made.
Assumption A: (i)The club member countries’ substitution matrices Skpp have max-
imal rank L − 1. (ii) The club members’ expenditure functions are strictly increasing in
utility, that is, Sku ≡ ∇uSk(p, uk) < 0.
Part (i) of this assumption is made to ensure that the net exports of each member
country are "controllable" by diﬀerential changes in domestic prices induced by changes
in world prices and trade taxes. It is well known that the substitution matrices Skpp are
singular and have rank less than or equal to L− 1. Our assumption that the substitution
matrices have maximal rank means that any (L− 1)× (L− 1) sub-matrix is of full rank
(L−1) and, hence, invertible. Requiring the substitution matrices to have maximal rank at
the initial equilibrium implies that any direction of compensated change dxk in net exports
can be achieved by some suitable change dpk in the domestic price vector for country k.
This controllability of net exports is important for our proof below and ensures that each
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member country has curvature to its net export function with well-defined derivatives,
whence net exports are diﬀerentially responsive to diﬀerential changes in domestic prices.6
Part (ii) of Assumption A states that the consumer needs to spend more on goods to
achieve a higher level of utility and is the weakest normality assumption that can be
made.7
We can now derive the following result.
Proposition 1 Let Assumption A hold at the initial pre-club equilibrium. Let the trading
club undertake non-discriminatory tariﬀs reforms and internal transfers to maintain the
pre-club vector of trade with the rest of the world. A strict Pareto improvement in club
welfare exists if, and only if, domestic price vectors for club members are not all the same
(up to a factor of proportionality), i.e. pk 6= αkjpj for some j and k and αkj 6= 0.
Proof. We are concerned with whether a solution to the linear system (5) exists with
duk > 0, k ∈ KM . By Motzkin’s theorem of the alternative, as expressed in Diewert,
Turunen-Red and Woodland (1989, p. 212), a solution exists if and only if there does not
exist a solution λ to the dual system
λ|[Skpu (k ∈ KM)] < 0, λ|[Skpp (k ∈ KM)] = 0, (6)
where the inequality x < 0 means that vector x is semi-negative (all elements are non-
positive and at least one element is negative).
(i) Let pk 6= αkjpj for some j and k and αkj 6= 0. Since Assumption A holds, the
6That is, we rule out kinks on the net export functions, i.e. functions that are not responsive to
diﬀerential changes in prices. The assumption that this rank condition applies to every country can be
readily relaxed at the expense of a more cumbersome wording of Proposition 1.
7Only one good needs to be normal in consumption at each level of utility, possibly a diﬀerent good at
diﬀerent levels of utility, to ensure that our normality assumption is satisfied.
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equation system λ|Skpp = 0 only has the nontrivial solution α
kpk (αk 6= 0) and the equation
system λ|Sjpp = 0 only has the nontrivial solution αjpj (αj 6= 0). For both equation systems
to hold, as in the second part of (6), we need αkpk = αjpj whence pk = (αj/αk)pj , which
contradicts the assumption that pk 6= αkjpj . Thus, (6) has no solution for λ and so, by
Motzkin’s theorem of the alternative, a strict Pareto improvement in union welfare exists.
(ii) Let all domestic price vectors be equal up to a factor of proportionality, that is
pk = αkp0 where p0 is the common price vector. Thus, λ = p0 solves the equations
λ|Skpp = 0 for all k ∈ KM . Also, λ|Skpu = p0|Skpu = (1/αk)pk|Skpu = (1/αk)Sku < 0 for
all k ∈ KM since Sku < 0 due to the assumption that the consumer expenditure functions
are increasing in utility (part (ii) of Assumption A). Thus, there is a solution λ to (6)
and hence, by Motzkin’s theorem of the alternative, there does not exist a strict Pareto
improvement in union welfare.
This proposition implies that any subset of countries may form a non-preferential
trading club that results in a strict Pareto improvement for the club and unchanged welfare
for each other country. By carefully choosing the tariﬀ reforms and internal transfers,
the same external trade vector is ensured and this, in turn, ensures that world prices
are unaltered and that other countries have unchanged welfare. By coordinating the
tariﬀ reforms, a more eﬃcient allocation of production and consumption within the club
generates welfare improvements for the club members.
To properly interpret Proposition 1, it is important to be clear about the context and
implications. First, the trading club arranges its policy reform in such a manner that the
vector of aggregate trade of the club members with the rest of the world, and hence the
vector of world prices of all traded goods are unchanged. In this sense, the trading club
adopts a KWO approach to its policy choice. Second, however, the proposition refers to
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non-discriminatory tariﬀ reform by the members of the trading club. The club members
each have arbitrarily given initial tariﬀs and choose to alter national tariﬀs in a non-
discriminatory way. The resulting national domestic price vectors are, in general, diﬀerent
and there are no tariﬀ preferences given to club members. Accordingly, the club is neither
a free trade area nor a customs union. Third, an essential part of the coordination of tariﬀ
reforms by club members is a set of accompanying lump sum income transfers. It is these
transfers that allow the club members to enjoy a strict Pareto improvement in welfare
as a result of the tariﬀ changes; every club member gains. Collectively, the club creates
a more eﬃcient allocation of resources within the club through its reform of tariﬀs and
the transfers permit these eﬃciency gains to be distributed so that every country gains
in welfare. Finally, because the countries in the rest of the world face the same world
prices as before and, by assumption, choose to retain the same tariﬀ policies as before,
each country in the rest of the world has unchanged welfare.
To illustrate the content of Proposition 1, a numerical example is presented. This
example is drawn from Table A1 of Kennan and Riezman (1990). In this example, there
are three internationally traded products and three countries with identical Cobb-Douglas
preferences and fixed endowments that ensure a pattern of trade in which country i exports
product i and imports both of the other two goods. We arbitrarily assume that the
pre-club equilibrium is the Nash equilibrium and that countries 1 and 2 form a trading
club, i.e., KM = {1, 2}. The initial ad valorem tariﬀ rates for these countries are τ10 =
(0.0, 0.4203, 0.5044)0 and τ20 = (0.8142, 0.0, 1.0120)0, while the national utility vector is
u0 = (0.5934, 0.8574, 1.3203)0 and the aggregate club trade (net export) vector is xM0 =
(0.1261, 0.1646,−0.1796)0, showing that the (to be) club as a whole exports goods 1 and
2 to, and imports good 3 from, the third country. Thus, in this numerical example, each
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country imposes substantial tariﬀs on imports and does not tax exports. In the initial
equilibrium there are no income transfers.
The club members choose a small discrete, non-discriminatory reform of tariﬀs given
by ∆τ1 = (0.0,−0.0205, 0.0607)0 and ∆τ2 = (0.0, 0.0,−0.0381)0, while country 3 remains
passive. By construction, this reform succeeds in keeping the trade vector with country
3, and hence the world price vector, unchanged. The resulting change in the club utility
vector is ∆uM = (0.0006, 0.0009)0 À 0, so both club members experience a welfare gain,
while the utility of country 3 is unchanged. This outcome for the club is supported by a
lump sum transfer of 0.0021 units of income from country 2 to country 1.
The tariﬀ reform involves country 2 reducing its tariﬀ on imports of good 3 (the tariﬀ
rate on good 1 was assumed fixed), while country 1 reduces its tariﬀ on imports of good 2.
Country 2’s reduction in the tariﬀ on good 3 induces that country to import more of that
good from country 3. Hence, to help ensure an unchanged club trade vector, country 1 is
required to reduce its imports of good 3 and it does this by raising its tariﬀ rate on good
3. As compensation for this club reform requirement, which raises the domestic price paid
by consumers and harms them, country 1 is provided with a lump sum transfer of 0.0021
units of income from country 2.
The consequence of this coordinated tariﬀ reform, accompanied by an income transfer,
is that both club members are better oﬀ while the non-member is unaﬀected as predicted
by Proposition 1. The existence of the welfare gain is based upon the assumption that
the initial equilibrium has intra-club price diﬀerentials. This welfare gain is achieved
through a reduction in distortions within the club leading to a reduction in intra-club
price diﬀerentials. These convergences are not necessarily applicable to every product as
the example shows - one tariﬀ rate increases, for example - but they apply ‘on average’. It
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is noteworthy that the policy reform undertaken by the club members involves a reform in
the general direction of tariﬀ reductions but not uniformly so in view of the requirement
that aggregate club trade is unchanged. Also noteworthy is the fact that no trade subsidies
are involved.
Of course, this is just one of an infinity of possible reforms that the club can take
to raise the welfare of its members. The set of all diﬀerential reforms can be found
by evaluating the matrices Skpp and S
k
pu at the initial equilibrium for this example and
computing solutions to the diﬀerential system (5) that yield welfare improvements.
Proposition 1 above leads to several related results concerning welfare reform. These
results follow from consideration of a sequence of small discrete policy reforms by the
trading club. The first result concerns the welfare eﬀects along such a policy path and the
second result concerns the nature of the equilibrium arising at the limit of the sequence
of policy reforms by the trading club.
1. When ever the domestic price vectors of the trading club members are not all equal
(up to a factor of proportionality), there exists a sequence of suﬃciently small discrete
changes in the tariﬀs and internal transfers of club members that yields strict Pareto
improvements in club welfare. Since the proof of Proposition 1 does not require initial
inter-club transfers to be zero, it may be used to show that a sequence of reforms
that keep the world price vector unchanged is welfare improving. Again, since we
require strict Pareto improvements suﬃciently small discrete policy reforms yield
the desired outcome.
2. If all members of the trading club have the same (up to a factor of proportionality)
domestic price vectors then the equilibrium is conditionally Pareto optimal for the
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club and every member imposes a common, non-discriminatory tariﬀ vector. This
equilibrium is Conditionally Pareto Optimal for the trading club in the sense that
the equilibrium is Pareto optimal for the members of the club, given that the trading
club employs a KWO-like policy whereby world prices for traded goods are kept at
their initial pre-club values. Accordingly, given the KWO-like policy, the resulting
equilibrium is Pareto optimal in that no member can be made better oﬀ without
making some other member worse oﬀ. This situation arises as a continued sequence
of trading club reforms eventually eliminates all diﬀerences in domestic prices.8
The essence of Proposition 1 on the existence of Pareto-improving reforms and of these
two consequences or corollaries can explained and illustrated geometrically by using Figure
1. The axes measure the quantities of the two traded goods. The point y is the club’s
aggregate production vector (assumed fixed for simplicity) while point c is its aggregate
consumption vector before and after the formation of the club. The diﬀerence is the net
import vector for the club, again both before and after the formation of the club. Thus, the
figure reflects our adopted KWO approach whereby the club ensures that the aggregate
club trade vector with the rest of the world and, hence, the world price vector are the
same before and after the formation of the club.
Figure 1: (about here)
The rectangular box formed by the origin and aggregate production point y shows the
allocation of production between the club members. Thus, point Y denotes the production
8Not only are strict Pareto improvements not possible for club members, but weak Pareto improvements
are also not possible. Since the proof in Proposition 1 refers to strict Pareto improvement, it does not apply
without alteration here. A proof of Pareto optimality (lack of weak Pareto improvements) is available from
the authors upon request.
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points for the members (with origin for the production box at y for member 2).
The rectangular box formed by the origin and the point c is the Edgeworth-Bowley box
for the analysis of intra-club exchange between the two club members. Thus O1 denotes
the origin for member 1, while c (labelled O2) becomes the origin for member 2. Point C is
the initial consumption point (showing vector c10 from origin O
1 and vector c20 from origin
O2). Clearly, this point is Pareto sub-optimal since the slopes of the indiﬀerence curves
through this point (hence initial domestic prices) are diﬀerent. Consumption points that
are Pareto superior to C occur in the cigar shaped area labelled PCO. Pareto optimal
points that are weakly preferred to C occur on the curve labelled PO.
Beginning at the initial consumption point C, the arrowed path indicates the sequence
of small discrete changes to consumption for the two single-household members of the
trading club. The initial Pareto-improving tariﬀ reform takes the club from point C to
point R. The welfare improvement exists because the domestic price ratios in the two
countries diﬀer, thus forming an interior to the cigar shaped area PCO. In the case
illustrated, both countries have the same trade pattern (both export good 1 and import
good 2) and the movement from C to R involves an expansion of the trade vector of
country 1 and a corresponding contraction of the trade vector of country 2. Accordingly,
the reduction in the tariﬀ on imports of good 2 by country 1 is accompanied by an increase
in its imports of good 2, while the reduction in the subsidy on imports of good 2 by country
2 is accompanied by a reduction in its imports of good 2 (or, equivalently, reduction in the
tax on exports of good 1 by country 2 is accompanied by a reduction in exports of good
1). Thus, the club’s reform policy reduces the overall distortion for the club members.
The next reform in the sequence moves the club from point R in a Pareto-improving
direction indicated by the second arrow. At each stage in the sequence, the utility level
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for each member country increases. As shown in Figure 1, this sequence is arranged to
converge to point Q, which lies on the Pareto optimal curve labelled PO. At this point
the domestic price vectors of the two club members are identical and so no further Pareto
improvements for the club are possible.
There are, of course, an infinity of Pareto-improving paths that the trading club can
take, possibly leading to a diﬀerent points along the (conditionally) Pareto optimal set
PO. One such path takes the club from point C to point S and then via a sequence of
discrete steps to point T . Along this path, the coordinated trade tax policy ensures that
country 1 expands its trade vector (all trades are increased proportionally) while country
2 proportionately contracts its trade vector, the proportions being chosen to ensure that
the aggregate trade vector is unchanged. This policy corresponds to Bagwell and Staiger’s
(1999, 2004) concept of ‘reciprocity’. Of course, such a policy is a very special case of our
more general Pareto-improving policy for the club. Moreover, there is no guarantee that
a sequence of such policies will work, since, drawn diﬀerently, the line through R and S
may depart from the Pareto-improving cigar-shaped area with point T not being on the
conditional Pareto optimal curve PO. Figure 2 illustrates such a case; indeed, the line
CT does not enter the Pareto-improving area.
Figure 2 : (about here)
It is important to recognize that convergence to Pareto optimality for club members
does not imply that the club members eventually have internal free trade. Hence, the
club is not a customs union. Each member country employs a non-discriminatory tariﬀ
vector against trade with every other country - club members and countries in the rest
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of the world are treated exactly the same as far as tariﬀ policy is concerned. Moreover,
a particular implication of the common domestic prices (pk = pM for all k ∈ KM) is
that each country must have a common tariﬀ vector τM = pM − p. This means that the
member countries have ‘harmonized’ their tariﬀ vectors. However, note that this needs to
be interpreted carefully since the member countries may, and generally will, have diﬀerent
trade patterns. Equality of domestic prices means that 1 = pki /p
l
i = (1 + τ
k
i )/(1 + τ
l
i),
where τki is the ad valorem trade tax rate. Thus, for example, one member’s import duty
on tennis balls (τki > 0) equals another member’s export subsidy on tennis balls (τ
l
i > 0).
9
Of course, subsidies may not be necessary in the limiting equilibrium. In figure 2 , both
countries are on the same side of the market, exporting good 1 and importing good 2 at
both the initial and limiting equilibria. Their initially diﬀerent import taxes on good 2 are
reduced as the club undetakes tariﬀ reforms and are eventually harmonized to be equal at
the limiting equilibrium given by point Q. No subsidies are needed in this case.
Our Pareto optimal trading club and the KWO customs union, although quite distinct
in formulation, nevertheless are closely related. Both employ the KWO mechanism for
fixing world prices and both employ internal transfers. On the other hand, while the KWO
customs union has discriminatory trade policy with internal free trade and a common
external tariﬀ, the trading club has non-discriminatory trade policy and hence does not
have internal free trade. Despite this diﬀerence, our Pareto optimal trading club and
the KWO customs union equilibria are essentially identical. This is the content of the
following proposition.
9Lerner symmetry prevails in our model, and thus an export subsidy is equivalent to an import subsidy.
The important point here is that we should allow for both trade taxes and subsidies to exist. The possibility
that a Pareto optimal equilibrium can be supported by trade taxes and subsidies is noted also by Mayer
(1981, p. 142) and by Bagwell and Staiger (1999, 2004).
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Proposition 2 The equilibria arising from a conditional Pareto optimal trading club and
a Kemp-Wan-Ohyama customs union are essentially identical. They have the same equi-
librium values for utilities, prices, consumptions, productions, trades and net incomes.
They diﬀer only in that member countries have potentially diﬀerent tariﬀ revenues and
transfer payments.
A heuristic explanation of the formal proof is provided below (the proof is available
from the authors upon request).
The KWO customs union (denoted by superscript U) maintains the external trade
vector at xU0 (and, hence, the world price vector at p0) by setting a common external tariﬀ
vector tU and by imposing internal free trade. The conditionally Pareto optimal trading
club maintains the external trade vector at xM0 and the world price vector at p0 by setting
a common non-discriminatory tariﬀ tM .
We take this conditionally optimal, non-preferential trading club and the associated
equilibrium and show that the club can be re-formed as a KWO customs union and that
the resulting equilibrium is essentially the same. Let this customs union set a common
external tariﬀ tU = tM and fix the external trade vector xU0 = x
M
0 . Since both the union
and the club impose the same tariﬀ vector, they will have the same domestic price vectors.
However, the fact that the customs union has free internal trade while the trading club
has not, suggests that incomes in the two regimes would be diﬀerent. For example, in the
case of a trading club, internal trade in tennis balls might involve a duty on imports into
country A from country B, but the common tariﬀ vector for the club members therefore
involves an export subsidy of exactly the same amount in country B. In aggregate, these
trade taxes cancel for the club, but at the country level the government of A gets revenue
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while that of B loses revenue. This clearly is not the case in a customs union where there
is no revenue accruing from internal trade. However, both the union and the trading club
are assumed to have a full set of income transfers at their disposal. Transfers can thus
be adjusted to neutralize the country tariﬀ revenue eﬀects and thereby to ensure that
household incomes will be the same in the two regimes. Thus, with domestic prices and
incomes being the same, the two regimes are indeed equivalent in a welfare sense.
The proposition and the above heuristic proof clearly highlight that the main element
of a KWO customs union, apart from the KWO mechanism for common external tariﬀ
choice, is the existence of intra-club transfers and not the choice of free internal trade.
We showed that a sequence of small discrete strict Pareto improving reforms by a trading
club that employs a KWO-like mechanism for tariﬀ reforms converges to an equilibrium
that is essentially equivalent to a KWO customs union. While that latter involves internal
free trade, our trading club does not. Thus, the common, and hence crucial, feature that
ensures welfare improvements for a KWO customs union and for a trading club is the
assumed existence of internal income transfers.
3 Conclusions
This paper has emphasized the value of coordinated non-discriminatory (and thus WTO
consistent) tariﬀ reforms, even if these reforms are taken only by a subset of countries
and not the whole world. We have shown that open regionalism, in the form of our
non-preferential trading clubs, can be Pareto improving for the world. Pareto optimality
is achieved by choosing trade policy reforms that maintain the initial world prices, thus
ensuring that non-member countries are unaﬀected, and that reduce the eﬀects of trade
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distortions for club members, thus improving the eﬃciency of resource allocation within
the club and raising welfare of club members.
An important policy issue that arises is whether our non-discriminatory tariﬀ reform,
by keeping world prices fixed, violates other WTO rules. Throughout the paper we have
been very careful in referring to ‘tariﬀ reform’ rather than ‘tariﬀ liberalization’. By con-
straining the club members’ tariﬀ reforms to ensure that world prices are unchanged, the
required reforms may require some tariﬀs to rise and some to fall. Indeed, some trade
tax rates may have to be negative (export/import subsidies) as the conditionally Pareto
optimal state is approached. In this sense, the trading club members’ tariﬀ reforms may
be in conflict with the written rules of the WTO. While this may be true, the tariﬀ re-
forms undertaken by our trading club are, arguably, not in conflict with the spirit of the
WTO rules, which is that non-participants of a new trading arrangement should not be
harmed. As long as our trading club tariﬀ reform produces weak Pareto gains to the world
community, it is therefore diﬃcult to criticize it for being against the spirit of the WTO.
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Non-Preferential Trading Clubs:
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This appendix provides the formal proofs of two results in the paper “Non-Preferential
Trading Clubs”. These results are that (1) the limiting case of a sequence of trading
club tariﬀ reforms yields a conditionally Pareto optimal trading club equilibrium and (2)
there is an equivalence between the conditionally Pareto optimal trading club and the
Kemp-Wan-Ohyama (KWO) customs union.
Proposition 3 Let Assumption A hold. If all members of the trading club have the same
(up to a factor of proportionality) domestic price vectors then the equilibrium is condition-
ally Pareto optimal for the club and every member imposes a common, non-discriminatory
tariﬀ vector.
Proof. We are concerned with whether a solution to the linear system
X
k∈KM
Skpp(p
k, uk)dpk +
X
k∈KM
Skpu(p
k, uk)duk = 0 (7)
exists with duM > 0, i.e. a weak Pareto improvement whereby at least one member
gains and no member loses. By Motzkin’s theorem of the alternative, as expressed in
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Mangasarian (1969, p. 34), a solution exists if and only if there does not exist a solution
λ to the dual system
λ
h
Skpu(k ∈ KM)
i
¿ 0, λ|
h
Skpp(k ∈ KM)
i
= 0,
where the inequality x ¿ 0 means that vector x is strictly negative (all elements are
negative). By assumption, all domestic prices are equal up to a factor of proportionality,
that is pk = αp0 where p0 is the common price vector. Thus, λ = p0 solves the equations
λ|Skpp = 0 for all k ∈ KM . Also, λ|Skpu = p0|Skpu = (1/αk)pk|Skpu = (1/αk)Sku < 0 for all
k ∈ KM since Sku < 0 due to the assumption that the consumer expenditure functions are
increasing in utility (part (ii) of Assumption A in the paper). Thus, there is a solution λ
to (A1) and hence, by Motzkin’s theorem of the alternative, there does not exist a weak
Pareto improvement in union welfare.
Proposition 4 The equilibria arising from a conditional Pareto optimal trading club and
a Kemp-Wan-Ohyama customs union are essentially identical. They have the same equi-
librium values for utilities, prices, consumptions, productions, trades and net incomes.
They diﬀer only in that member countries have potentially diﬀerent tariﬀ revenues and
transfer payments.
Proof. (i) Let the conditionally Pareto optimal trading club equilibrium for domestic
prices, club utilities and transfers be (pM , uM , bM), where uM = (ukM , k ∈ KM) and
bM = (bkM , k ∈ KM), when (p0, x0) are the given world price and external trade vectors.
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This equilibrium satisfies equation system
X
k∈KM
Skp (p
M , ukM) = x0 (8)
p|0S
k
p (p
M , ukM) = bkM , k ∈ KMX
k∈KM
bkM = 0,
comprising the club market equilibrium conditions, budget and transfer constraints. The
budget constraints may be expanded and expressed alternatively as
Ek(pM , ukM) = Gk(pM)− (pM − p0)|Skp (pM , ukM)− bkM , k ∈ KM . (9)
This shows that consumer expenditure equals income from production plus tariﬀ revenue
(T kM = −(pM − p0)|SkMp ) minus transfers abroad.
A KWO customs union comprising the same members KM faces the same initial
world prices p0 and chooses a common external tariﬀ vector tU = pU − p0 and transfers
to maintain the same initial trade vector x0. Let the KWO customs union equilibrium for
domestic prices, club utilities and transfers be (pU , uU , bU ), where uU = (ukU , k ∈ KM)
and bU = (bkU , k ∈ KM), when (p0, x0) are the given world price and external trade
vectors. This equilibrium satisfies equation system
X
k∈KM
Skp (p
U , ukU ) = x0 (10)
Ek(pU , ukU ) = Gk(pU )− αk(pU − p0)|x0 − bkU , k ∈ KMX
k∈KM
bkU = 0,
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comprising the union market equilibrium conditions, budget and transfer constraints.10
The budget constraint for country k states that consumer expenditure equals income from
production plus the common external tariﬀ revenue allocated to country k by the union
ak = −αk(pU − p0)|x0 (the proportion so allocated being αk and the common external
tariﬀ revenue being −αk(pU −p0)|x0) minus transfers abroad. The latter sum to zero over
member countries. In this specification, we can alternatively think of member country k
getting a ‘total transfer’ of βkU ≡ −αk(pU − p0)|x0 − bkU , comprising the tariﬀ revenue
allocated to it and the income transfer, −bkU . These ‘total transfers’ sum, not to zero,
but to the customs union tariﬀ revenue over the member countries.
We now construct a KWO customs union equilibrium from the trading club equi-
librium. In particular, consider the solution (pU , uU ) = (pM , uM). Clearly, under this
equality of variables, the market equilibrium conditions for the customs union given by
the first equation set in (10) are satisfied, being the same as for the trading club. It there-
fore remains to choose policy instruments (αk, bkU ), k ∈ KM , and then to demonstrate
that, given this policy choice, the remaining equations in (10) are also satisfied for the
solution (pU , uU ) = (pM , uM).
Choose the customs union transfers by
bkU = bkM , k ∈ KM , (11)
and the union’s customs allocation proportion by
αk =
−(pM − p0)|SkMp
−(pM − p0)|x0
, k ∈ KM , (12)
10For further details on this formulation of the customs union equilibrium conditions see Melatos and
Woodland (2003).
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where the denominator is aggregate tariﬀ revenue earned by club members, TRM =P
k∈KM −(pM − p0)|SkMp = −(pM − p0)|x0. Thus, the (outward) transfer from nation k
in the customs union is set equal to its transfer under the trading club equilibrium. In
addition, the proportion of customs revenue the union allocates to member k is set equal
to the tariﬀ revenue earned by country k as a club member as a proportion of total trading
club tariﬀ revenues.
With these choices in hand, it is straightforward to demonstrate that the constructed
customs union has an equilibrium identical to that of the trading club. Since it has already
been noted that the market equilibrium conditions are satisfied and it is obvious that the
chosen union transfers sum to zero, this is achieved by showing that the union’s budget
constraint for each country k is the same as under the club equilibrium. The budget
constraint for country k in the constructed customs union is
Ek(pU , ukU ) = Gk(pU )− αk(pU − p0)|x0 − bkU (13)
= Gk(pU )− (pM − p0)|SkMp − bkM , k ∈ KM . (14)
Also, under the assumption that (pU , uU ) = (pM , uM), the levels of consumer expendi-
ture and GNP will be the same for the customs union as for the trading club, that is,
Ek(pU , ukU ) = Ek(pM , ukM) and Gk(pU ) = Gk(pM). Thus, in view of the assumed equal-
ity (pU , uU ) = (pM , uM), the budget constraints under the customs union may be written
equivalently as
Ek(pM , ukM) = Gk(pM)− (pM − p0)|SkMp − bkM , k ∈ KM , (15)
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which is exactly the budget constraint applying under the trading club equilibrium.
Thus, it has been demonstrated that, if the union chooses a common external tariﬀ
tU = pM − p0, transfers bkU = bkM and customs allocation proportions αk given by (12),
then (pU , uU ) = (pM , uM) is an equilibrium solution for world prices and member utilities.
As a consequence, all other variables (such as production, consumption and exports)
take the same values in the customs union equilibrium as they did in the trading club
equilibrium. The customs union equilibrium is identical to the trading club equilibrium.11
It should be noted that the choice of transfers and customs revenue allocation propor-
tions is somewhat arbitrary. Both are ‘transfers’ from the union to the member countries
and what is important is that the ‘total transfer’ in the customs union is exactly the same
as the total amount the member country obtains from tariﬀs and transfers in the trad-
ing club equilibrium. Whatever the split between these two sources of transfer from the
union, provided each country gets the same income under the customs union regime as
obtained under the trading club regime (and this is always possible through the choice of
‘transfers’) the equilibrium prices, utilities and all real variables will be the same under
the two regimes. Our particular choices above meant that the transfers under the two
regimes are equal and that the customs union revenue allocated to each country exactly
coincides with the actual tariﬀ revenue obtained under the trading club regime.
(ii) By a similar argument, a Kemp-Wan-Ohyama customs union equilibrium may be
re-interpreted as a conditional Pareto optimal trading club equilibrium. The members of
the constructed club each choose tariﬀ vector tM ≡ pU − p0 = tU equal to the union’s
common external tariﬀ vector and transfers are chosen to ensure that member incomes
11Note also that the aggregate tariﬀ revenue for the trading club equals the common external tariﬀ
revenue for the customs union, since TRM =
P
k∈KM −(p
M−p0)|SkMp = −(pM−p0)|x0 = −(pU−p0)|x0 =
TRU .
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are the same in the club as they were in the union. This is achieved by choosing
bkM = bkU − (pU − p0)|Skp (pU , ukU) + αk(pU − p0)|x0, k ∈ KM , (16)
which comprises the union transfer plus the imputed common external tariﬀ revenue on
member k’s trade minus the actual tariﬀ revenue allocated to member k. Since the argu-
ment is analogous to that given in part (i) of the proof, details are not provided.
Together (i) and (ii) establish the essential (in all respects except possibly for the values
of the tariﬀ revenues and transfers) equivalence between a conditional Pareto optimal
trading club and a Kemp-Wan-Ohyama customs union.
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Figure 1: SPI Transition of Club to Conditional Pareto Optimality
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